Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized promises of future rents -for example, efficiency wages. This paper shows, theoretically and empirically, that illicit future rents have analogous incentive effects. When opportunities for future rent extraction increase, agents extract less rent today in order to preserve those opportunities. We study this "golden goose" effect in the context of India's vast National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. We compare official micro-records to original household survey data to measure corruption and trace out the impacts of an exogenous increase in the scheme's statutory wage to test the theory. We estimate that golden goose effects reduced the total elasticity of theft with respect to this shock by roughly 70%. This suggests that dynamics should be taken into consideration when calibrating incentives. It also advocates caution in interpreting policy experiments, since short-run trials generate different dynamic incentives than permanent implementation. Finally, the results provide indirect support for models of electoral discipline and for the efficiency wage hypothesis itself JEL codes: D73, H53, J30, K42, O12
Introduction
Disciplining corrupt officials is a key governance challenge in developing countries. In an influential early analysis, Becker and Stigler (1974) argued that if there is some chance of catching and dismissing corrupt agents then the problem can be mitigated by promising them an efficiency wage. Intuitively, agents have an incentive to cheat less today in order to improve their chances of earning wage premia tomorrow. This insight undergirds much theoretical work on corruption. 1 Our analysis begins with the simple observation that, in the Becker-Stigler framework, illicit rents should play a role analogous to licit wage premia. For example, agents have an incentive to cheat less today if this improves their chances of being able to extract bribes tomorrow. We call this the "golden goose" effect: agents wish to preserve the goose that lays the golden eggs (not kill it, as did the deplorably myopic farmer in the fable). 2
It is a dynamic effect in the sense that it arises when agents have repeated opportunities for corruption over time, so that one-shot models of corruption cannot capture it. In fact, as we illustrate in the model below, the static effects of policy changes tend to have offsetting dynamic effects. This paper defines the golden goose effect theoretically and then quantifies its importance. Bureaucratic jobs in which opportunities for corruption repeat themselves are ubiquitous, but consistently measuring corruption is an empirical challenge. 3 We work in the context of India's largest rural welfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). The scheme entitles every rural household in India to up to 100 days of paid employment per year, provided only that they are willing to do manual labor. The key feature for our purposes is that we were able to obtain disaggregated official records on participation, including the names and addresses of participating households, the duration of every spell of employment and the amount of compensation paid. Sampling from these records, we conducted an independent survey of (alleged) beneficiaries.
We can then compare the amount of work that local officials claimed was done and the amount of money those officials claimed as spent on reimbursing workers to independent measures of work actually done and compensation actually received. The gap between official and actual quantities -including over-reporting of days and under-payment of wages -is the primary form of corruption we study To test whether this form of corruption responds to variation in anticipated rentextraction opportunities we need an exogenous source of variation in the latter. We 1 See Cadot (1987) , Andvig and Moene (1990) , Besley and McLaren (1993) , Mookherjee and Png (1995) , and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) , among others.
2 Our usage thus differs from that of McMillan (2001) , who uses the term "golden goose" to refer to ex-ante investments by individuals that a government cannot commit not to hold up ex-post. Commitment will not be an issue in our setting.
3 See Olken (2009) on the reliability of perceptions measures of corruption.
exploit a policy shock: a 1 May 2007 increase in the statutory wage due to program participants in the state of Orissa. A higher statutory wage meant more lucrative corruption opportunities for officials, since they received more money for every fictitious day of work reported. Importantly, the wage reform was enacted by policy-makers well removed from the officials we study, making it plausibly exogenous. Moreover, because the wage increase was specific to the state of Orissa, we can use data from the neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh as a control in some specifications.
How does a wage change help us identify golden goose effects? In Section 3 we develop a formal model of NREGS corruption which shows how the effects of the wage change can be decomposed into a static price effect and a dynamic golden goose effect. The price effect is straight-forward: when officials receive more money for every day of wage work they report, they tend to report more fictitious days of wage work. But since the wage change was permanent they also anticipate a more lucrative future, and this dynamic effect tends to make them more conservative. The net effect on daily wage over-reporting is thus ambiguous.
To separate the price effect and the golden goose effect we exploit an additional institutional feature of our environment: roughly 30% of the NREGS projects in our study area operated on a piece rate basis, rather than a daily wage one. Different projects used different payment schemes because piece rates could not be implemented on projects where worker output is hard to measure. The list of projects to be implemented had been fixed in advance of the 1 May 2007 wage change, and piece rate schedules were not revised along with the daily wage, so this reform should not have directly affected piece rate projects. However, many officials who were managing piece rate projects at the time of the shock also had daily wage projects planned for the near future. Consequently they should have anticipated an increase in future rents. Moreover, this effect should have been stronger for officials with a higher proportion of daily wage projects upcoming.
The model thus predicts that the wage increase should (1) reduce theft from piece rate projects, and (2) differentially reduce corruption in areas with more daily wage projects upcoming.
We take these predictions to panel data on corruption before and after the policy shock in 215 panchayats (villages). We find that prices do matter: when statutory daily wages increase, officials report more fictitious work on wage projects. None of the increase in the statutory wage passed through to the wages actually received by workers, and consequently the supply of labor to NREGS projects was unaffected. Overall, the daily wage increase from Rs. 55 to Rs. 70 (combined with secular trends) increased the cost to the government per dollar received by beneficiaries from $4.08 to $5.03.
Within this broad picture, however, we also find the two forms of evidence for golden goose effects predicted by the model. First, theft on piece rate projects in Orissa declined after the shock, both in absolute terms and relative to neighboring Andhra Pradesh.
Second, both daily-wage overreporting and piece rate theft were differentially lower after the wage increase in the parts of Orissa which subsequently executed the most daily wage projects -i.e. areas where the shock had the greatest impact on future rent expectations.
Rough calculations imply that the wage increase raised theft by approximately 70% less than it would have had it been temporary, and thus not affected future rent expectations.
We consider a variety of alternative explanations for these results. Alternative mechanisms generally imply time-symmetry: the effects of future rent expectations should be similar to the effects of past and current rent realizations. For example, if the marginal value of rents is decreasing then officials who have extracted large rents in the past should be conservative, just like officials who expect to extract large rents in the future. Empirically, however, we find a robust role only for the future. We also test directly for confounding changes in the intensity with which implementing officials were monitored by their superiors and find no evidence thereof.
Understanding golden goose effects is important for predicting the impact of anticorruption policies. Consider increasing the steady-state probability that an agent will be audited: as is well-known, the static effect of this change is to make illicit behavior less attractive. But the same argument applies in the future as well, so that expected future illicit rents will decrease. This in turn lowers the continuation value to the agent of keeping his job, which makes any kind of illicit behavior today more attractive -he may steal less on the margin being audited but more on other margins. Golden goose effects thus provide the general lesson that static and dynamic effects tend to offset each other, as well as an alternative explanation for "displacement effects" such as those documented by Yang (2008) .
Golden goose effects also influence the interpretation of policy pilots, in which dynamic effects differ from those generated by perpetual implementation. For example, distributing welfare benefits once does not generate dynamic disincentives for theft, but distributing them repeatedly does. A pilot may therefore appear to perform artificially poorly. Conversely, a one-shot crackdown on corruption does not affect future rent expectations and may thus be more effective than a program of perpetual audits.
Understanding dynamics is thus important for interpreting the literature on the impacts on corruption of monitoring (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003 , Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders and Taylor 2002 , Olken 2007 ) and of transparency more generally (Reinikka and Svensson 2005, Ferraz and Finan 2008) .
Since the golden goose effect and the efficiency wage effect both work through expectations of future rents, our results provide indirect support for efficiency wage theories, which have proved difficult to test (Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) being the notable exception). Moreover, given that some of the officials implementing NREGS are elected, our results support the leading models of electoral discipline, in which the need to promise politicians some future rents puts a limit on how well voters can control their behavior (Barro 1973 , Ferejohn 1986 , Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997 , Ahlin 2005 , Ferraz and Finan 2009 ).
In documenting the extent and nature of corruption in the NREGS we contribute to the literature on the costs of corruption, which include the inability to remedy market failures (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna and Mullainathan 2007) and to redistribute wealth (Reinikka and Svensson 2004, Olken 2006) . These results are directly relevant in the Indian policy context, where the NREGS plays a central role and is a volatile political issue with much of the debate centering on leakage.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the NREGS context, Section 3 lays out the theoretical framework, Section 4 describes data collection and estimation equations, Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 concludes.
Contextual Background on the NREGS
India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is a landmark effort to redistribute income to the rural poor. The program was launched in February 2006 in the poorest 100 districts in India and as of April 2008 covers the entire country (604 rural districts).
The total proposed budget allocation for the 2010-2011 fiscal year is Rs. 401 billion (US$ 8.9 billion), which is 0.73% of 2008 GDP. 4 It is likely that the steady-state cost will be higher as implementation is still incomplete in many parts of the country.
Statutory Operational Procedures
Each operational program cycle begins before the start of a fiscal year, when local governments at the Gram Panchayat (GP or panchayat, lowest level of administration in the Indian government, comprising of a group of villages) and block (intermediate level of government between GPs and districts) levels plan a "shelf" of projects to be undertaken during the upcoming year. The particular types of project allowed under the NREGS are typical of rural employment projects: road construction and earthworks related to irrigation and water conservation predominate.
Projects also vary in the payment scheme they utilize: NREGS workers can be paid either on a daily wage or a piece rate basis depending on the practicality of measuring output. Our conversations with low-level officials in Orissa indicated that the decision about how to pay workers is generally made on a project-by-project basis and by officials 4 Costs: http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/bh/bh1.pdf. GDP: http://mospi.nic.in/4_ gdpind_cur.pdf. The central government must by law contribute at most 90% of total expenditure, the rest of the funding coming from the states. Plots distribution of projects in study panchayats by the fraction of spells of (reported) work done that were daily wage spells. Work spells are coded as daily wage spells if the payment per day is one of the statutory daily wages. (Orissa implements four different daily wages for varying skill levels.)
at the block level. Empirically it is the case that all the work done on any particular project is generally compensated in the same manner (see Figure 1 ). Consequently there are identifiable daily wage projects and piece rate projects. While according to statute the project shelf should be proposed by village assemblies (Gram Sabhas), in practice higher up officials at the Block and District level suggest and approve the shelf.
A key feature of the NREGS is that it is an unrestricted entitlement program: every household in rural India has a right to 100 days of paid employment per year, with no eligibility requirements. 5 To obtain work on a project, interested households must first apply for a jobcard. 6 The jobcard contains a list of household members, some basic demographic information, and blank sheets for recording work and payment history. In principle, any household can obtain a jobcard for free at either the panchayat or block administrative office. Jobcards in hand, workers can apply for work at any time. The applicant must be assigned to a project within 15 days after submitting the application, if not they are eligible for unemployment compensation. Applicants have no influence over the choice of project.
5 Consequently officials do not have an opportunity cost of allocating work to workers, as in Banerjee (1997) .
6 Since each household is limited to 100 days of employment per year the definition of a household is important. In NREGS guidelines a household is "a nuclear family comprising mother, father, and their children, and may include any person wholly or substantially dependent on the head of the family". (Ministry of Rural Development 2008) At the work sites the panchayat officials record attendance (in the case of daily wage projects) or measure output (in the piece rate case). They record this information both in workers' jobcards and in muster rolls which are sent to Block offices and digitized.
The state and central governments reimburse local governments on the basis of these electronic records. Most workers in our study area receive their wages in cash from the panchayat administration, although efforts to pay them through banks are under way. As a transparency measure, all the official micro-data on payments have been made publicly available through a web portal maintained by the central Ministry of Rural Development (http://nrega.nic.in).
Implementing Officials
The officials in charge of implementing the program are mainly appointed bureaucrats at the block (Block Development Officers, Junior Engineers, Assistant Engineers) and panchayat (Panchayat Secretary, Field Assistants, Mates, etc) levels, with the exception of the elected chairman of the Gram Panchayat (the "Sarpanch"). The work of these officials is overseen by district level program officials, including the District Collector.
While officials can be fired, suspended, or removed from their jobs for misconduct, Article 311(2) of the Indian constitution says that no civil servant can be dismissed without an official enquiry, which makes it difficult to fire someone outright. However, suspensions and transfers into backwater jobs are common punishments (Das 2001 ).
Because our analysis revolves around forward-looking optimization it is useful to understand bureaucratic tenure in these jobs. Tenure is typically short, primarily because transfers are used as a disciplinary tool and as a way for political parties to bestow favors. Iyer and Mani (2009) document that the district-level Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers who oversee local officials stay in a job for a year and a half on average, and since they often move with their staff this implies that the tenure of lower-level officials is at least as short. In Gujarat, Block Development Officers keep that post for an average of sixteen months (Zwart (1994) , p 94). Given the small but significant pay differential between private sector and public sector jobs at this level (Das 2001 ) and the short tenure, local public officials often seek opportunities for extracting rents.
Opportunities for Rent Extraction
Officials' opportunities for illicit gain include control over project selection; bribes for obtaining jobcards and/or employment; and embezzlement from the materials and labor budgets. We focus on theft from the labor budget, which we can cleanly measure. The labor budget is required by law to exceed 60% of total spending, and in fact we find that theft in this category is so extensive that even if all of the 40% allocated to materials were stolen, the labor budget would still be the larger source of illegal rents. 7
Theft from the labor budget comes in two conceptually distinct forms. First, officials can under-pay workers for the work they have done (theft from beneficiaries). Second, officials can over-report the amount of work done when they send their reports up the hierarchy (theft from taxpayers). 8
Monitoring and Enforcement
A key difference between theft from beneficiaries and theft from taxpayers lies in the way they are monitored. Underpaid workers who know they are underpaid could potentially complain to someone at the block or district headquarters. 9 On the other hand, workers have little incentive to monitor over-reporting: because the program's budget is not fixed, a rupee stolen through over-reporting does not mean a rupee less for the workers. Realistically, then, over-reporting must be monitored from the top down. The Officials caught cheating face a low but positive probability of getting caught. Program guidelines call for "speedy action against [corrupt] officials" but do not lay out specific penalties. In practice the most likely penalty is suspension or transferal to a less desirable job; for elected officials it is loss of office. 10 The strength of enforcement in Orissa is 7 We also found that bribes paid to obtain jobcards are uncommon (17% report paying positive amounts) and small (averaging Rs. 10 conditional on being positive). This is not surprising given that (1) a jobcard is an entitlement and not receiving a jobcard is a relatively verifiable event; (2) households can apply to either the panchayat or the block office, which potentially creates bribe-reducing competition (Shleifer and Vishny 1993) ; (3) the NREGS places no limit on the number of participants, so officials actually have positive incentives to sign up participants. Note that this last feature implies that there is less scope for corruption to "grease the wheel," or improve efficiency by getting around cumbersome red tape or regulations (Leff 1964 , Huntington 1968 .
8 For example, a worker who worked for 10 days on a daily wage project when the statutory minimum wage was Rs. 55 per day might receive only Rs. 45 per day in take-home pay. The official might report that the worker had worked for 20 days rather than 10. His total rents would then equal 55 · 20 − 45 · 10 = 650 rupees, the sum of the two sorts of theft.
9 In practice, however, only 7% of respondents said they would complain to one of these officials if they had a problem, because of the costs of complaining (53%) and the low probability that a complaint would be successful (37%). See Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) . Two key features of this policy change are that it did not directly affect payments on piece rate projects and that it was specific to Orissa and did not affect neighboring Andhra Pradesh.
the punishment is suspension, transfer, or permanent dismissal. Similarly, some degree of collusion between local officials and their monitors would not change the qualitative predictions. 11 http://www.orissadiary.com/Shownews.asp?id=6201 12 http://www.dailypioneer.com/59458/Action-taken-after-study-finds-fake-muster-roll-in-Boudh. html.
Dynamic Rent Extraction
Following the seminal work of Becker and Stigler (1974) , a large theoretical literature has studied the use of dismissal threats to motivate corruptible agents. In this section we adapt the Becker-Stigler model to our setting and draw out the role that illicit future rents play in shaping the agent's decision-making. The driving assumptions are that the chance the official is caught and punished increases in the amount of corruption he engages in, and that the penalty for being caught is dismissal. We adapt the model to our context by explicitly modeling the distinct forms of corruption that we measure empirically: overreporting on daily wage projects, under-payment on daily wage projects, and aggregate theft on piece-rate projects. We will show how combining standard theoretical elements with these margins yields testable predictions about the effects of a statutory wage change.
Time is discrete. An infinitely-lived official and a group of N infinitely-lived workers seek to maximize their discounted earnings stream:
where y i (τ ) are the earnings of agent i in period τ . Additional players with identical preferences wait in the wings to replace the official should he be fired.
In each period exactly one NREGS project is active. We abstract from simultaneous ongoing projects primarily to simplify the exposition; it is also true, however, that most of the panchayats in our sample have either one or zero projects active at all times during our study period. Let ω t = 1 indicate that the active project at time t is a wage project, and ω t = 0 that it is a piece rate project. We represent the "shelf" of projects as an infinite stochastic stream of projects: at the beginning of each period a random project is drawn from the shelf with
We suppose that all agents know φ but do not know exactly which projects will be implemented in the future. At the cost of a small loss of realism, this approach ensures that the dynamic environment is stationary and greatly simplifies the expression of comparative statics. It also permits a close analogy between the model and our empirical work, in which the fraction of future projects that are daily wage (a measure of φ) plays a key role. We treat φ as exogenous here since de jure it should be predetermined for our study period, but we will also check in our empirical work that it does not respond to the wage change.
Each worker inelastically supplies one indivisible unit of labor in each period. We will interpret a unit flexibly as either a day (in the case of daily wage projects) or as a unit of output (in the case of piece-rate projects). Labor may be expended on an NREGS project or in the private sector, where worker i can earn w t (r t ). Let n t (q t ) be the number of days (output units) supplied to the project when ω t = 1 (ω t = 0), and let and w t i (r t i ) be the wage (piece-rate) that participating worker i receives. This need not equal the statutory wage w (the statutory piece rate r).
NREGS wages and employment levels emerge from bargaining between the official and the workers. As we show in a companion paper (Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2010) , participants NREGS wages (w t i ) and their participation choices (n t ) are determined by the prevailing market wage rate w t in the village and are not affected by the statutory NREGS rate w. Thus while in principle labor supply n t depends on the official's wage offers {w t i } we ignore this dependence since w t i = w t for all (i, t). We further simplify matters by abstracting from time variation in the market wage, so w t = w and n t = n.
Participation n and the average participant's wage w (piece rate r) are thus predetermined once the official chooses how much workn t to report. If the current project is a wage project, official's period t rents will be
Over-reporting w and analogously if it is a piece-rate project,
Over-reporting r Over-reporting the amount of work done puts the official at risk of being detected by a superior and removed from office. The probability of detection on daily wage projects is π(n, n), with π(n, n) = 0 for any n, π 1 > 0, π 2 < 0, and π 11 > 0 for all n; the last condition ensures an interior equilibrium amount of over-reporting. We also assume that if n > n then π((n + x), n) ≤ π((n + x), n ). This condition ensures that officials weakly prefer to have more people work on the project; it would be satisfied if, for example, the probability of detection depended on the total amount of over-reporting or on the average rate of over-reporting. The probability of detection on piece rate projects is µ(q t , q) with entirely analogous properties. If an official is caught we assume that he is removed from office before the beginning of the next period and earns some fixed outside option normalized to zero in every subsequent period. In practice corrupt officials are sometimes suspended rather than fired; modeling this would affect our results only quantitatively. 1314
The recursive formulation of the official's objective function is
where V (w, 1) is the official's expected continuation payoff in a period with a daily wage project, V (w, 0) is his expected continuation payoff in a period with a piece rate project, and V (w) is his expected continuation payoff unconditional on project type.
We first derive the official's response to a temporary, one-period change in the statutory daily wage. These are not testable predictions, since the wage change we study below was a permanent one. Rather, because they coincide with the predictions a static oneperiod model would deliver, they help highlight the consequences of modeling dynamics.
Proposition 1. A one-period increase in the statutory daily wage w
• Increases over-reporting on daily wage projects (n t − n)
• Has no effect on theft from piece rate projects (q t r − qr)
These results are straightforward to derive because the official's continuation value V (w, φ) is not affected by a temporary wage change -one can think of it as analogous to the pension that Becker and Stigler (1974) proposed giving to officials who complete their careers without incident. Because this quantity is fixed the wage change acts like a pure price shock for officials managing daily wage projects: the value of over-reporting a day of work goes up, while the cost is unaffected. Consequently over-reporting increases.
As for officials managing a piece-rate project, neither the costs nor the benefits of stealing have changed.
When the statutory wage changes permanently this generates both the static effects above and also dynamic effects working through changes in the official's continuation value V (w, φ). This can potentially reverse the model's predictions for daily wage overreporting unless an inelasticity condition holds:
Proposition 2. Over-reportingn t −n on daily wage projects is increasing in w if w V ∂V ∂w < 1 and decreasing otherwise.
Proof. All proofs are deferred to Appendix A. This prediction is ambiguous because a higher statutory wage has two offsetting effects. The first is the price effect identified above: a higher wage increases the benefit of over-reporting. The second is a golden goose effect: a higher wage raises the value of future over-reporting, which in turn increases the importance of keeping ones job. The former effect dominates only if the elasticity of future benefits with respect to the wage is sufficiently small. This tension between static and dynamic effects is a general feature:
any increase in the "scope" for rent extraction -new opportunities, lower costs, weaker monitoring -will have a direct tendency to increase rent extraction, but will also raise the continuation value of the game to corrupt officials, which will tend to reduce current rent-extraction.
While it illustrates this tension, Proposition 2 also implies that over-reporting of daily wage work is not a useful outcome variable with which to test the theory. One way to obtain a test is to look at effects on forms of rent extraction that are not directly affected by the wage increase, such as theft from piece-rate projects.
Proposition 3. Total theft from piece-rate projects (q t r − qr) is decreasing in w.
Here we obtain an unmitigated golden goose effect. A higher statutory wage has no effect on current rent-extraction opportunities for a bureaucrat managing a piece-rate project. It does, however, increase expected future rent extraction opportunities, which discourages theft.
We can construct an additional test by exploiting cross-sectional variation in the intensity with which the wage change affects official's future rent expectations. Since the wage change only affects rents in future periods during which a wage project is running, one might expect to see differentially stronger effects in places with more future wage projects upcoming (higher φ). As it turns out things are not quite this simple: if piece rate and daily wage projects are not equally lucrative then there may be additional sources of treatment heterogeneity working through these "wealth effects". If the rents from piece rate and daily wage projects are approximately the same, however, we get the prediction one intuitively expects:
Proposition 4. Restrict attention to any closed, bounded set of parameters (φ, w, r, w, r).
In our empirical work we will first verify that equilibrium rents from daily wage and piece rate projects are similar, and then test this prediction.
Confounding Explanations
While the predictions above are testable, they are not necessarily unique to our model.
One potential confound involves the "production function" for corruption. We believe that the bulk of corruption in our setting simply involves writing one number on paper instead of another. Suppose, however, that this requires the use of some scarce input that can be shifted across time (e.g. effort). Then the wage shock would induce officials to optimally re-allocate this input across time, giving rise to patterns similar to those we predict. Second, if officials care about things other than consumption then the wage shock might have income effects. The expectation of large future rents would lower the expected relative marginal utility of income now, leading to lower corruption. Finally, empirical tests could potentially be sensitive to issues of time aggregation. In our empirical work we treat the day as the basic unit of time, but monitoring might be based on less frequent observations. This would mechanically imply that officials expecting to steal more tomorrow would steal less today, since the probability of detection would depend on the sum of today's report and tomorrow's.
The key difference between the golden goose effect and each of these mechanisms is that while the former is purely forward-looking, the latter are all time-symmetric. An important point regarding the official records is that the 100-day-per-household constraint essentially never binds. During fiscal year 2006-2007 only 4% of jobcards in our study area in Orissa are recorded as having reached 100 days, and all panchayats had a significant number of jobcards with less than 100 days -on average 95% of the cards in the panchayat, and at a minimum 22%.
We used as our sample frame the official records for the states of Orissa and Andhra
Pradesh as downloaded in January 2008, six months after our study period to allow time for all the relevant data to be uploaded. As a cross-check we also downloaded the official records a second time in March 2008. We found that the records for Orissa remained essentially unchanged, but that the number of work spells recorded for Andhra Pradesh had increased by roughly 10%. These new observations were spread uniformly across space and time and so do not appear to have resulted from delays in processing records for specific panchayats or projects. They do, however, generate some uncertainty about the appropriateness of our AP sample frame, and so we will emphasize the Orissa data and use AP as a control only in Table 5 .
We sampled from the list of officially recorded NREGS work spells during the period March 1st, 2007 to June 30th, 2007 in Gajapati, Koraput, and Rayagada districts in Orissa. Within these districts, we restricted our attention to blocks at the border with AP. We sampled 60% of the Gram Panchayats within study blocks, stratified by whether the position of GP chief executive had been reserved for women. (Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find evidence suggesting that these reservations affect levels of corruption.)
Within these panchayats we sampled 2.8 percent of work spells, stratified by Panchayat, by whether the project was implemented by the block or the panchayat administration, by whether the project was a daily wage or piece-rate project, and by whether the work spell was before or after the daily wage shock. This yielded a total of 1938 households. We set out to interview all adult members of these households about their NREGS participation, so that our measures of corruption would not be affected if work done by one member was mistakenly reported as having been done by another. Details on survey results and a sample description are in Appendix B.
Survey Content
We asked respondents retroactively about spells of work they did between March 1, 2007
and June 30, 2007. A spell of work is a well-defined concept within the NREGS: it is an uninterrupted period of up to two weeks employment on a single project. For each spell we asked subjects the dates during which they worked, the number of days worked, what project they worked on, whether they were paid on a piece rate or daily wage basis, what payment they received, and in the case of piece rate projects what quantity of work they did. While recall of most of these variables is good, recipients have difficulty recalling the quantity of work done on piece rate projects -the amount of earth they moved, volume of rocks they split, etc. Consequently in our empirical work we treat theft on piece rate projects as unitary -q t r − q t r t in terms of the model -keeping in mind that it includes theft both from beneficiaries and from taxpayers. In addition to the survey of program participants, we also asked a separate questionnaire to village elders with questions on labor market conditions, agricultural seasons and official visits in the village.
While imperfect recall could potentially be a concern given the lag between the study period and our survey, results were very encouraging. This is likely because the NREGS was a new and very salient program, and spells of work were likely to be memorable and distinct compared to other employment. Moreover, since participants do not necessarily get paid what they are owed and often not on time, they are likely to keep track of how much they worked and what they received. Finally, we designed the survey carefully to prompt memory (e.g. using major holidays as reference points) and trained surveyors to jog respondents' memories. Consequently, we obtained information on at least the month in which work was done for 93% of the spells in our sample. We do not find significant differential recall problems over time: in a variety of specifications including location fixed effects and individual controls such as age and education, subjects' estimated probability of recalling exact dates increases by only 0.7%-2.2% per month and is not statistically significant. Since our main tests exploit discrete time-series changes while controlling for smooth trends, these patterns should not introduce bias.
Survey interviews were framed to minimize other potential threats to the accuracy and veracity of respondents self-reports. We made clear that we were conducting academic research and did not work for the government, to discourage them from claiming fictitious underpayment; in the end most respondents reported that they had been paid what they thought they were owed. None of the interviewed households have income close to the taxable level and will have ever paid income taxes, so there are no tax motives for underreporting. Conversely, officials had little need to secure workers' collusion in their over-reporting. All a worker could possible supply would be a signature, which has little relevance when most people cannot write their own name. There is also no reason to believe that respondents would under-report corruption for fear of reprisals, since they could not have known how many days they were reported as having worked in the official data. Finally and most importantly, there is no reason to think any of these issues would lead to differential biases (which would affect our results) and not just level ones (which would not). Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) confirms that the wage shock had no effect on the self-reported variables we use in our analysis.
Empirical Specifications
Our empirical analysis includes all spells of work from our survey data that contain information on at least the month of the spell, the number of days worked, and the wages received. We impute start or end dates if unavailable, 16 and construct time-series of survey reports of work done and wages paid by aggregating data at the panchayat-day level for the sample period. Similarly, we construct time-series of the official data by aggregating official reports of work done and wage paid of only those households who we interviewed or confirmed as fictitious over the sample period.
We code the wage change as a simple dummy variable equal to 1 after May 1, 2007.
To control for periodicity in both actual and official reports of days worked (see Figure   3 ), and also any spurious correlations over time, we include various time trends and an indicator for major public holidays. Because opportunities for corruption may depend on how much work is ongoing we include non-parametric controls for number of days of work actually done (DayCat), in the form of indicator variables for each number. Note that while the model yields predictions for over-reporting (n t − n), we are allowing for more flexible functional forms by including n non-parametrically on the right-hand side.
We also include district fixed effects (δ) in certain specifications. All standard errors are two-way clustered by panchayat and day. To sum up, for outcome Y in panchayat p at time t we have:
Identification rests on the assumption that unobserved factors affecting the optimal amount of theft are orthogonal to the shock Shock t after controlling for general time trends.
We can relax this identifying assumption by using data from the neighboring district of Vizianagaram in Andhra Pradesh to control for unobserved time-varying effects common to the geographic region under study. This approach is, however, subject to several caveats. First, we can only utilize it when estimating models of piece-rate theft, since essentially all projects in Andhra Pradesh are piece rate. Second, as noted above a substantial number of new observations appeared in the official Vizianagaram records after we selected our sample. Finally, Andhra Pradesh made two revisions to its schedule of piece rates during our sample period, the latter of which took effect on March 25th, 2007. Because of its proximity to the daily wage change in Orissa this shock limits the value of Andhra Pradesh as a control for high-frequency confounds, although it may still be useful for low-frequency ones.
Keeping these limitations in mind, we estimate
The coefficient of interest in this specification is β 1 , the differential effect of the postshock period ORshock t on corrupt behavior in Orissa, indicated by OR p . We control for a variety of time and state-specific time trends.
To test Proposition 4 we need an empirical analogue to φ, the probability that a future project in our model is a daily wage project. For each panchayat-day observation we calculate the fraction F wdW ageF rac of project-days in the upcoming two months that are daily wage project-days. This time window appears reasonable given the relatively short tenure (12-16 months) of appointed officials, but we will also report results using one month and three month windows, which are not qualitatively different. We define a "project-day" as a day on which a particular project is running, and define a project as running if work on that project as been reported in the past and will be reported in the future.
Our goal in constructing this variable is to capture variation in the proportion of daily wage projects on the panchayat's "shelf" of projects as cleanly as possible. While the quantities of work reported or the amount of rents earned in the future are clearly endogenous, the proportion of projects that are daily wage should not be if the project shelf is fixed in advance as required by law. We test this idea below and show that our measure of shelf composition is unaffected by the wage shock. Even if this were not the case, we expect that biases would tend to work against us rather than for us: panchayats that increased their corruption most in response to the shock would be the most likely to switch to wage projects, generating a positive bias on the Shock t * F wdW ageF rac pt term. We thus test Proposition 4 by checking that β 2 < 0 in the following estimation:
Y pt = β 0 + β 1 Shock t + β 2 Shock t * F wdW ageF rac pt + β 3 F wdW ageF rac pt + T ime t γ + DayCat pt φ + δ p + pt (4.3) Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in our regressions. This table provides summary descriptions of the aggregated variables used in the main result tables 3 and 4. The sample for each kind of project includes panchayats that had at least one of that kind of project active during the study period (March 1 through June 30 2007). "DW Days Official" is the days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as reported officially. "DW Days Survey" is the days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as reported by survey respondents. "PR Rate Official" is the total payments by panchayat-day on piece rate projects as reported officially, while "PR Rate Survey" corresponds to the same figure as reported by survey respondents. "FwdWageFrac" is the proportion of project-days in the next two months in a panchayat that are daily wage.
5 Results: The Golden Goose Effect
Preliminaries: Wages, Quantities and Rents
We begin with a series of preliminary tests of the main identifying assumptions. First we verify that the policy change was actually implemented; Figure 2 shows this clearly. The average rate officially reported as being paid on daily wage projects stays fairly constant near Rs. 55 up until May 1st and then jumps up sharply thereafter. Interestingly it does not immediately or permanently reach the new statutory wage of Rs. 70, because not all panchayats implemented the change -some continued to claim the old rates after May 1st, presumably because they were not informed about the change. 17
Figure 2 also shows that the wage rate actually received by workers was unaffected by the shock. (It appears to trend slightly downwards but this effect is largely compositional 
Average Rate on Daily Wage Projects (Orissa)
Official Actual
Plots a daily series of the average wage rate paid in daily wage projects in Orissa over the study period, according to official records and survey data. Day 60 corresponds to March 1st, 2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1st, 2007, the date of the wage shock; and day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period.
and vanishes once we control for district fixed effects.) It is notable that during the first month of our study period the average wage received by workers actually exceeded the average wage claimed by officials. The discrepancy is driven by a large number of observations from Gajapati district where prevailing market wages are relatively high.
Anecdotally, officials in these areas overpay workers to execute projects so that they can then over-report the amount of work done by an even greater proportion.
Second, we check whether NREGS rents are an important enough source of income for officials to generate golden goose effects. Ideally we would compare NREGS rents to officials' wage premia, the difference between their official compensation and their outside options. We can estimate total NREGS rents per panchayat (or block) per month by calculating the difference between actual and reported payments in our sample and then scaling up by the inverse of the sampling percentage. We do not observe outside options, however, so we must confine ourselves to comparing rents to official compensation. Even then the contrasts are stark. The estimated rate of rent extraction per panchayat is roughly 150 times the rate at which sarpanchs are compensated, and the rate per block is a staggering 1,100 times the rate at which Block Development Officers are compensated.
Clearly the NREGS dominates official compensation as a source of income.
Third, we check whether pre-shock rent extraction from daily wage and piece rate projects are similar, as predicated by Proposition 4. Dividing total theft in the two categories of projects by the number of actual days worked on those projects, we find that the rate of theft per day worked is very similar post-shock; Rs. 236 per actual day worked in daily wage projects as opposed to Rs. 221 in piece rate projects. 18 Next, we check whether project shelf composition responds endogenously to the wage shock. In principal it is fixed at the start of the fiscal year (March 2007), but if officials had scope to reclassify or re-order projects they might have prioritized wage projects. In fact the fraction of projects that are daily wage fell from 74% before 1 May to 72% afterwards.
More formally, Table 2 reports regressions of F wdW ageF rac on an indicator for the shock along with time controls. The point estimates are insignificant and correspond to a 0.05 standard deviation change in project composition. These results corroborate the testimony of block-level officials that the shelf of projects and payment schemes is pre-determined. They are also natural given that changing the designation of project is a more readily observable form of corruption than over-reporting.
18 These figures are scaled to reflect misreporting of days worked as daily wage projects when in fact they were designated as piece rate projects in the official data. In general, this kind of misreporting is rare: 82% of spells are reported correctly, whereas 15% of piece rate spells are reported as daily wage spells.
Finally, the project shelf composition is also essentially uncorrelated with key political variables like reservations for women and minorities at the sarpanch and samiti representative level; it is also uncorrelated with the number of locally active NGOs and with village elders perceptions of the relative wealth and relative political activism of the village, and with indicators for visits from block and district officials. The one significant relationship we uncovered was with the share of the population belonging to scheduled castes, and since very few scheduled castes live in our study area this explains very little variation in the shelf. 19 In closing, we note that any undetected bias in the shelf composition would likely work against our predictions: panchayats that increased their corruption most in response to the shock would be most likely to switch to daily wage projects, generating a positive bias on the Shock t * F wdW ageF rac pt terms in our regressions.
Over-reporting of Days Worked in Daily Wage Projects
We begin our core analysis by examining the reported number of days worked on daily wage projects. Figure 3 shows the evolution of this figure and the corresponding amount of real labor supplied over time. The absence of a clear effect of May 1st mirrors the ambiguous nature of Proposition 2, which states that the effect of a wage shock depends on the elasticity of future rents with respect to the wage. It is difficult to tell from the figure whether over-reporting went up or down after the wage change. Table 3 reports that the effect of the wage shock on over-reporting of daily wage days is positive; however, none of the three specifications has a significant coefficient on the wage shock. Column 1 presents the basic specification, which includes a third-order polynomial in day of month and an indicator variable for major holidays in order to control for the monthly periodicity and sharp dips evident in the figure above, in addition to the linear time trend reported in the table. We also include non-parametric controls for the number of days of work actually done, flexibly accounting for n in the model. Column 2 adds higher-order time terms, while column 3 adds district fixed effects to the specification in column 2. These changes do not affect the coefficient on the wage shock, which remains positive but short of statistical significance. Might this reflect a countervailing force to the price effect of the increase in daily wage?
Columns IV-VI in Table 3 suggest that this is the case. They show that the direct effect of the wage shock is indeed positive and significant at the 10% level. However, there is a strongly significant negative interaction between the wage shock and the forward-looking fraction of daily wage projects, as predicted by Proposition 4.
Columns I-VI are estimated on the entire sample of panchayats that ever reported any activity on a daily wage project. This is the simplest approach but, since there 19 We have also included these characteristics directly as controls in our regressions and they do not change our findings. All results available on request. are many panchayat-day observations in which no projects are active, potentially biases our estimates down towards zero. Columns VII and VIII re-run our main estimators on the restricted sample of panchayat-days during which at least one daily wage project was "active," meaning that some work on that project had been reported in the past and would be reported again in the future. As expected this simply magnifies the point estimates, leaving our main conclusions unchanged.
Theft in Piece Rate Projects
As opposed to the predicted effect on over-reporting of daily wage days which was ambiguous, Proposition 3 suggests that the effect on theft in piece rate projects is unambiguously negative. Since the wage shock only affects daily wage projects, current opportunities for theft from piece rate projects are unchanged, and the expected future benefits cause officials to be more cautious. 
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The dependent variable in this table is the number of days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as reported officially. Columns I-VI (full sample) include all panchayat-day observations from panchayats that had a daily wage project at any time during our study period. Columns VII and VII include only those panchayat-day observations during which a daily wage project was active. "Shock" is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. "FwdWageFrac" is the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the future. The variable Day represents a linear time trend. The variable Day 2 has been rescaled by the mean of Day. All columns include the following standard controls in addition to the variables show above: non-parametric controls for number of days of work actually done, a third-order polynomial in the day of the month, and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust standard errors -multi-way clustered by panchayat and day -are presented in parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Figure 4 shows the evolution of the official and actual payments in piece rate projects over the sample period. A decline in theft is evident immediately after the wage shock, as the officially reported payments fall while the actual payments rise. Interestingly, this decline is followed by a rebound. While we do not test the idea formally, this fact is broadly consistent with our interpretation, since NREGS piece-rate projects largely cease operation during the monsoons which start in late June in Orissa, reducing future rent expectations. Official Actual
Total Payment under Piece Rate (OR)
Plots a daily series of the average amount of theft in piece rate projects in Orissa over the study period, by subtracting the wages paid as reported by survey respondents from officially reported wages. Day 60 corresponds to March 1st, 2007, the start of the study period; day 121 to May 1st, 2007, the date of the wage shock; and day 181 to June 30, 2007, the end of the study period.
Regression analysis confirms the visual evidence. Table 4 presents the same specifications as in table 3, with the total reported payments on piece rate projects as the dependent variable. The effect of the wage shock is negative in all three specifications in columns 1-3 and is significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the coefficientabout Rs. 80 per day -is also economically meaningful compared to the average theft per panchayat-day observation prior to the shock was Rs. 102. 
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The dependent variable in this table is the total amount paid by panchayat-day on piece-rate projects as reported officially. Columns I-VI (full sample) include all panchayat-day observations from panchayats that had a daily wage project at any time during our study period. Columns VII and VII include only those panchayat-day observations during which a daily wage project was active. "Shock" is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. "FwdWageFrac" is the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the future. The variable Day Columns 4-6 in Table 4 report tests of Proposition 4. As with daily wage overreporting we find a negative differential effect of the shock in panchayats with a relatively high fraction of daily wage projects upcoming, and again we estimate a positive coefficient on the interaction between the shock and past project composition. These results are not, however, significant since power is limited due to the relative infrequency of piece-rate projects in Orissa (see Figure 1) ; even the indicator for holidays, which is consistently statistically significant across estimations in the daily wage case, has extremely high standard errors in this case. As with the daily wage regressions, restricting the sample to panchayat-days when at least one piece rate project was active (column VII and VIII) scales up the coefficients and improves power. Overall the point estimates provide suggestive evidence which is consistent with our model predictions.
Difference-in-Differences Results
We can potentially improve the power of our tests and rule out time-varying confounds by using Andhra Pradesh as a control. Table 5 reports estimates of Equation 4 .2, the differences-in-differences specification. The Orissa-specific effect of the daily wage shock in Orissa is negative, larger than the first-differences estimate, and significant across all specifications. Column I is the base model; Column II introduces finer-grained locality fixed effects, Column III adds non-linear time controls, and Column IV allows for statespecific trends. While these estimates are subject to the concerns noted above, they are strongly supportive of the golden goose hypothesis.
Robustness Checks
For our preferred estimators we use the fraction of daily wage project-days in the upcoming two months as the key interaction variable. While the choice of a time window over which to calculate these variables is inherently somewhat arbitrary, a two-month window is sensible on several grounds. The tenure of bureaucrats in the relevant postings is quite short, approximately a year, so that longer forecasts of project shelf composition would not be relevant for their decision-making. Second, as per program guidelines official reports are aggregated bi-weekly, so that it is plausible for an official to be detected and punished within a two-month window. As discussed above, punishment when it arrives can arrive swiftly.
Nonetheless, we can also vary the length of the window to see whether the results are sensitive to this assumption. Columns DW I and PR II of Table 6 present the main specification for daily wage over-reporting and piece rate theft, respectively, using a one month window for calculating FwdWageFrac; while the point estimates are somewhat smaller and not statistically significant, the results are qualitatively similar, as one would The dependent variable in this table is the total amount paid by panchayat-day on piece-rate projects as reported officially; these regressions now include data from both Orissa (OR) and Andhra Pradesh (AP). "OR Shock" is an indicator equal to 1 on and after has been rescaled by the mean of Day. All columns include the following standard controls: non-parametric controls for number of days of work actually done, a third-order polynomial in the day of the month, and indicators for major agricultural seasons. Robust standard errors -multi-way clustered by panchayat and day -are presented in parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted as: * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 expect if a one-month window is too short a time frame to accurately capture officials'
incentives. Columns DW II and PR II present the same specifications with three-month windows; here the results are very similar to those with a two month window. We interpret these results as implying that a two month window is the shortest time frame for which golden goose effects can be detected.
Using a two-month window also allows us to symmetrically test alternate models that also generate predictions similar to golden goose effects by including an interaction between the shock and a backward-looking fraction of wage projects. The coefficient on this interaction variable is positive, small and insignificant Columns DW III and PR III. 20 This is inconsistent with the class of models that generate time-symmetric effects of corruption opportunities, but consistent with the golden goose mechanism whereby only future opportunities depress current theft.
A third issue has to do with the exact timing of the effects we are attributing to the May 1st policy change. Equation implicitly assumes that the dynamic effects of the wage change take effect at the same point in time as the static ones. If, however, officials learned about the wage change before it took place then dynamic effects might begin earlier than the direct, static ones. The 1 May wage change we study was the culmination of a process that began on 10 January with the publication of a proposal to change wages, and it is possible that officials acquired information over time about whether or not the proposal would be implemented. To explore whether our causal interpretation of the coefficients on the post-May indicator is correct we re-ran our main specifications using more flexible functions of time. Columns DW IV and PR IV of Table 6 reports results using indicators for each month (we ran similar specifications using bi-weekly dummies and reached similar conclusions). In general the estimates are imprecise. There is some evidence -significant for daily-wage over-reporting -that the differential effect of the FwdWageFrac (though not the direct effect of the shock) begins earlier in April. This is consistent with the view that at least some officials learned about the wage change before it took place and began adjusting accordingly.
Is Monitoring Affected?
One final concern is that the intensity with which officials were monitored by their supervisors changed around the same time as the daily wage change. Official notifications and instructions regarding the wage change did not include any provisions regarding monitoring, and officials and the block and panchayat level do not have implicit incentives to monitor linked to the amount of corruption (for example, it is not the case that a detecting official earns a reward proportional to the amount the detected official stole). The dependent variables in this table are the number of days worked by panchayat-day on daily wage projects as reported officially ("DW") and the total amount paid by panchayat-day on piece-rate projects as reported officially ("PR"). "Shock" is an indicator equal to 1 on and after May 1, 2007. "FwdWageFrac" is the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the future. "BkWageFrac" is the proportion of daily wage project-days in the panchayat in the past. "Time Window" refers to the length of time that "future" and "past" represent. Let t be the month in which a given panchayat was last visited by an official. We suppose that the probability of the panchayat receiving a visit is independent (but not identical) across months, as would be the case under optimal monitoring with symmetric information. Call p(τ |θ, d) be the probability that a panchayat in district d receives a visit at time τ . Assume that p has the logit form
Under our independence assumption the probability that the panchayat's last visit was at time t (i.e. p(visit at t) x p(no visit since)) is
Similarly, the probability that a panchayat did not receive a visit since the beginning of the NREGS is
where t is the NREGS start date. We estimate this model via maximum likelihood for both BDOs and Collectors and for various specifications of p, in each case testing the null γ = 0. 21 Table 7 reports the results. The estimate of γ is positive but small and insignificant for BDOs; for collectors it is positive and insignificant when controlling linearly for time and is actually significantly negative when controlling for a quadratic in time. We conclude that there is no evidence of an increase in monitoring intensity associated with the change in the daily wage.
21 In a small number of panchayats respondents could only remember the year, and not the month, of the most recent visit by an official. We allow these observations to contribute to the likelihood function by simply calculating the probability that the most recent visit fell in the given year. Our results are insensitive to omitting these observations. 
Interpreting Magnitudes
The coefficients above give some sense of the economic importance of golden goose effects.
A more systematic way to describe effect sizes is to compare the estimated increase in theft due to the shock to a counterfactual estimate of the increase that would have been generated by a temporary wage hike, which would not generate any golden goose effects.
We estimate the actual increase in theft attributable to the shock as the sum of three components. First, there is a mechanical component equal to the predicted quantity of daily wage over-reporting absent the shock multiplied by the change in the average daily wage. Second, there is a behavioral response in daily-wage over-reporting that varies depending on panchayat shelf composition; we estimate this using the coefficients from Column IV of Table 3 . Third, there is a negative behavioral response in piece-rate theft, which we estimate using the coefficient in Column I of Table 4 (a conservative assumption given that the difference-in-difference estimates of the latter effect are larger). We sum these effects to obtain an estimate ∆ actual of the total effect of the shock on rent extraction.
To construct a counterfactual estimate of the increase ∆ counter resulting from a temporary wage hike we perform a similar calculation but omit the contributions of the piece rate regressions and the forward-looking interaction term in the daily wage regressions.
Our estimates imply that the dampening effect 
Conclusion
Dismissal, suspension, and transfer are standard tools for disciplining corrupt agents. We show that these incentives generate a "golden goose" effect: as steady-state opportunities to extract rent increase the value of continuing in office increases and this induces agents to act more cautiously. This dynamic mechanism tends to dampen, and may reverse, the predictions of static models.
We test for golden goose effects using panel data on corruption in India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, exploiting an exogenous increase in program wages to construct tests. We find two forms of evidence consistent with our theory: higher daily wages lead to lower theft from piece rate projects, and differentially lower theft in areas with a higher proportion of daily wage projects upcoming. Rough calculations based on the point estimates imply that these effects reduced the increase in corruption generated by the wage change by approximately 68%.
22 As an illustration, if a perfectly patient (β = 1) official only supervises wage projects (φ = 1) and over-reports a fixed numbern − n of days per period, then the sensitivity of his continuation value to the daily wage ∂V ∂w =n − n π(n, n) (5.4)
becomes very large as the probability of detection π falls.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let θ = (φ, w, r) represent the full set of parameters, and Θ the parameter space, which is closed and bounded by assumption. After some algebra, As before, (r, r t , q t ) fixed imply thatq t r − q t r t moves withq t .
B Survey Results and Sample Description
We interviewed households during January and February 2008. Given the sensitive nature of the survey, and the dangers inherent in surveying in a region beset with Maoist insurgents, conflict between mining conglomerates and the local tribal population, and tensions between evangelical Christian missionaries and right-wing Hindu activists, our surveyors were asked not to enter villages if they felt threatened in any way. 23 We could not perfectly predict trouble spots in advance, hence out of the original sample of 1, 938
households, we were unable to even attempt to reach 439. The main obstacles were an incident which caused tensions between a mining company and locals in Rayagada and a polite request by Maoist rebels ("Naxals") not to enter certain areas of Koraput. As Table 8 shows, the differences between the initial sample and the analysis sample generated by this attrition are reassuringly small and generally insignificant. Particularly important, there is no difference in the rate at which we reached households that worked before or after the wage change. The one significant difference is the fraction of spells performed by members of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, which is higher in the initial sample because the factors related to violence were concentrated in tribal areas.
Values for the frame and initial sample are essentially identical by design.
Of the 1499 households we did attempt to reach, we managed to reach or confirm the non-existence/permanent migration/death of 1408 households. In order to determine whether an individual/household that was included in the official records was actually non-existent or dead or no longer lived in the village, we asked surveyors to confirm the status with 3 neighbors who were willing to supply their names on the survey. Households who match these stringent standards are included in the analysis as fictitious. We exclude from the analysis 91 households whose status we could not verify, who were temporarily away, or who declined to participate.
Of the 1328 households in which we completed interviews, only 821 confirmed having a household member who worked on an NREGS project during the period we asked about. 24 Those households that actually worked on NREGS are very similar to those that did not. In general, the sample is poor, uneducated, and uninformed, even when compared to averages across India or Orissa. Seventy-seven percent of households possess 24 Since we had exact descriptions of the projects -e.g. "farm pond construction near main road X in village Y and Panchayat Z" -we are confident that respondents could distinguish between NREGS projects and other projects. Reports summary statistics at the work-spell level using official records and for (a) the universe of spells sampled from, (b) the initial sample of work spells we drew, and (c) the work spells done by households we were ultimately able to interview. The last column reports the p-value from a regression of the variable in question on an indicator for whether or not the observation is in our analysis sample (conditional on being in our initial sample), with standard errors clustered at the panchayat level Below Poverty Line cards, only 27% of household heads are "literate" (able to write their names), and almost no one has heard of the Right to Information Act (which entitles citizens to request copies of most government records).
